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Reduced runway separation standards are among the means which have been proposed for in- 
creasing airport capacity. The probability of a blunder will dominate the calculation of safe 
separation standards. Then the determinant of safe system performance will be the system 
reaction time comprised of the air traffic controller’s detection, decision and communication 
delays, and the response times of the pilot and aircraft in executing a collision avoidance 
manuever. Estimates of these times, based on existing data, show that the delays ascribable to 
the human portions of the man-machine system are comparatively unimportant. New develop- 
ments in radar, computers, and data links will be required to provide any substantial improve- 
ment of the existing system, and the goal of 2500 f t  of separation may not be achievable. 
INTRODUCTION 
By the summer of 1969, in the United States, 
the growth of air carrier traffic and of operations 
by elements of the general aviation fleet had led 
to readily apparent distress and to certain dis- 
locations with respect to the capacity of major 
airports and the functioning of the air traffic 
control system. Very lengthly departure delays 
were frequently encountered. In the eyes of some 
travellers, the matter seemed to approach the 
quality of a civil disaster when some members of 
the organized air traffic controllers staged a “sick 
out” in the middle of the summer. The peak 
travel period in the summer of 1970, however, 
did not seem quite as bad. At the present time, 
the air carriers have cut back their schedules, the 
Boeing 747 aircraft (capable of carrying many 
more passengers per departure or arrival) have 
come into service in substantial numbers, and in 
some cases, such as at JFK International Airport, 
the imposition of high landing fees has dis- 
couraged air taxi operators and commuter airlines 
from using the airport. This has led, at least by 
comparison, to a breathing spell during which 
new solutions to  the problems may be sought. 
The problems, of course, are by no means 
entirely technological. The proposed solutions are 
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increasingly subject to economic and particularly 
to political constraints. In the vicinity of New 
York City, for example, every proposed location 
for the “fourth” jetport has been opposed by 
some groups, and two of the locations considered 
promising by the Port of New York Authority 
have been defeated in voter referendums. 
While clearly recognizing the often conflicting 
interests of airport developers and the airport’s 
neighbors, the report of the Department of 
Transportation Air Traffic Control Advisory 
Committee (the Alexander Committee) (ref. 1) 
says flatly: 
Air traffic is in crisis . . . major improvements in current 
airport capacity must be achieved. (Emphasis added) 
I n  another place, the same report says: 
The conclusions reached on air traffic control for the 
1980’s and 1990’s assume that runway capacity in the 
dense traffic areas will be provided. This is our present 
severe bottleneck, and the improvements to the ATC 
system discussed in this report will not be significant 
unless the airport (runway) problems are also resolved. 
(Emphasis added) 
Further on, the report says, in part: 
. . . additional capacity can be provided by utilizing 
airport acreage more efficiently by decreasing the 5,000- 
foot separation between independent IFR runways. The 
Committee believes it will be possible to safely reduce 
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this separation between runways to 2,500 feet and the 
final spacing on approach to two mites. This will require 
an improved landing aid, such as the scanning beam 
microwave ILS, as well as provisions for precise monitoring 
and data linked commands in case of blunders. 
At the present time, and for the forseeable 
future, the enforcement of safe separation stan- 
dards will require the joint efforts of human air 
traffic controllers and pilots and will involve a 
geographically vast and technologically complex 
array of (‘machines” including radars, beacons, 
digital computers, displays, and communications, 
as well as aircraft with their primary and secon- 
dary flight control and propulsion subsystems. In  
short, the augmentation of runway capacity by 
means of reduced separation standards will de- 
mand the utmost performance of a truly named 
man-machine system. Faithful adherents of the 
‘(Annual Manual,” over a comparatively short 
period of time, have witnessed explosive develop- 
ment of a theory of manual control for at least 
certain problems in man-machine systems. We 
take it that manual control theory is understood 
to involve an abstraction of the performance of 
human operators in such a way as to allow an 
analysis of the relationship between the con- 
troller(s) and the “object of control.” In particu- 
lar, in our view, the abstraction and the analysis 
are mathematical. Can manual control theory 
contribute to the determination of safe separation 
standards for terminal area air traffic control? 
We propose in this paper to demonstrate that it 
can. It will, however, eventuate that the perfor- 
mance of the system with respect to separation 
standards is not critically sensitive to the per- 
formance of the air traffic controller and the pilot. 
Determination of safe separation standards for 
operations on independent IFR runways may be 
influenced by consideration of an inordinately 
large number of combinations of system parame- 
ters and subsystem performances. Among these 
are 
0 Runway configurations 
0 Aircraft types (e.g., CTOL and STOL 
Airborne equipment complement (e.g., flight 
Gust, wind, and wind shear environment 
0 Data acquisition system capabilities (e.g., 
aircraft) 
director or automatic coupled approach) 
airport surveillance radar) 
The type of operation (e.g., front course or 
back course approach with or without simul- 
taneous departures, etc.) 
The frequency of occurrence of blunders 
0 Controller intervention rules 
0 Controller response 
0 Pilot response 
as well as, possibly, still other factors. We are 
unprepared to deal with all these factors in any- 
thing like an exhaustive fashion. Instead, we shall 
assume a prototype problem which will serve the 
primary purpose of providing a setting or back- 
ground for considering the influence of controller 
and pilot responses on the performance of the 
system. 
T H E  PROTOTYPE PROBLEM 
Consider two conventional aircraft approach- 
ing an airport along parallel paths. These paths 
are separated laterally by a distance which is 
currently set a t  5000 ft for ‘independent” IFR 
operations. (Independent here means that no 
account is taken of any possible separation of the 
aircraft in a direction parallel to their tracks.) 
Because of gusts and wind shears, radio beam 
anomalies, spurious control actions, etc., the 
motion of each airplane is a random function of 
time which can be presumed to take place with 
respect to some mean or average motion which 
carried each aircraft toward its landing runway. 
In  the absence of better information, we can 
assume that the distributions of the three car- 
tesian displacements and the corresponding ve- 
locities of each aircraft with respect to their 
mean paths are Gaussianly distributed and in- 
dependent. This appears to be reasonable for 
small displacements and velocities, but it is 
generally conceded that the assumption will 
seriously underestimate the frequency of large 
deviations. This is because of the possibility of 
((blunders.” 
A blunder is a random process in the sense 
that its occurrence is probabilistic, but, for our 
purposes a t  least, where it occurs it is a single 
deterministic function of time. An example of a 
dangerous blunder would be a mbnuever which 
would place one of the approaching aircraft on 
a collision course with another. 
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A typical case of parallel approaches has the 
aircraft on extended runway centerlines 762 m 
(2500 ft) apart. Without air traffic controller 
intervention, in order for the variances of the 
time functions representing the random motions 
of each aircraft with respect to its mean motion 
to contribute as much as 1 percent to the overall 
probability of a collision, we have calculated that 
it would be necessary that any blunder occur less 
frequently than once in 7.787 X lo1' approaches. 
(This has been done by a method similar to the 
one given in references 2 and 3. The exposition 
of the method is worth a paper in itself.) Another 
representation of this fact is that a t  the mean 
level of instrument approaches in the United 
States in the years 1964-1966 inclusive (6.16X lo6 
instrument approaches per year), if blunders 
occurred more often than approximately once 
in a million years, the statistics with respect to 
blunders would completely dominate the deter- 
mination of safe separation standards. We may 
easily believe and act on the belief that this is 
the case. 
Given that blunders can and do occur, we 
wish to inquire as to the effect of air traffic con- 
troller intervention in maintaining the safety of 
operations. 
In  our prototype problem, we, therefore, as- 
sume that the progress of both of the airplanes 
on parallel approach paths is being monitored 
by a final controller using a display of secondary 
surveillance radar data. (This is currently the 
case at major airports). Where, on the basis of 
the information available to him, the final con- 
troller detects a violation of one aircraft's colli- 
sion threat space by the other, he will issue a 
warning to one or both pilots. (We shall neglect, 
for simplicity, the probability that the controller 
does not detect the threat.) One or both pilots 
will then execute a collision avoidance maneuver. 
This will allow the system to be "safe" provided 
only that the parallel approach paths are suffi- 
ciently separated so that there is time for the 
controller to detect the threat, to communicate 
a warning, and for the pilot(s) to complete an 
avoidance maneuver. This time may be very 
considerable. The total time is called the system 
reaction time TR. It has the following components: 
Data acquisition delays 
0 Data processing delays and uncertainty 
9 Controller decision delays 
0 Controller/Pilot communication delays 
Pilot effective reaction time delays 
0 Aircraft response delays as determined by its 
Speed 
Maximum rate of climb 
Maximum bank angle. 
In  order to be able to place the controller's 
and the pilot's performances in perspective, we 
choose a particular example blunder scenario. 
This is illustrated in figure 1. The numbers 
associated with the graph are choosen for con- 
venience, but they are approximately repre- 
sentative. The aircraft are on "independent" 
parallel approach paths a t  the same altitude and 
separated by 1250 m (4100 f t )  laterally. (This 
latter is a little less than the current minimum 
separation, but it is rather more than what it is 
hoped can be achieved.) Each aircraft is pro- 
ceeding at 61 m/sec (200 ft/sec). At time t = O ,  
aircraft A preceeds aircraft B by 488 m (1600 
f t ) .  At that point in time, aircraft A initiates a 
postulated blunder, banking to an average bank 
angle of 35" for approximately 7 sec and then 
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FIGURE 1.-A blunder scenario. 
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recovering to straight flight. The surveillance 
radar beam sweeps over the positions of both air- 
craft once every 5 sec. (The airport surveillance 
radar at JFK International Airport rotates 13 
times per min.) Assuming that the beam has just 
passed both aircraft a t  t=O,  the positions of both 
aircraft a t  5 sec intervals, as they might appear 
to the air traffic controller, are indicated by the 
heavy dots in figure 1. In  the absence of con- 
troller intervention there will be a collision be- 
tween the two aircraft at t= 32 sec. Is there time 
in which to  detect the threat, issue a warning, 
and have the innocent pilot and aircraft respond? 
ESTIMATE OF T H E  SYSTEM 
REACTION TIME 
I n  principle, without rate weighting, the aver- 
age effective time delay in radar data, sampled 
once every 5 sec, is half the sampling period. We 
may, however, take a more pessimistic view with 
respect to the geometry of figure 1. At t = 5 sec 
the blunderer, aircraft A ,  is only a little more 
than 76.2 m (250 ft) off course. The data are 
somewhat noisy in any case and on the scale of 
the display this error would be nearly imper- 
ceptible to the controller. When the radar next 
determines the position of aircraft A ,  it might 
be clear to the traffic controller that he should 
intervene. Conventionally (ref. 4), this is done 
so as to command aircraft A to turn away from 
the “no transgression line” perhaps established 
half-way between the approach paths. We shall 
shortly justify in more detail a figure of 2.3 sec 
for the time required for the controller to com- 
municate a warning to the pilot and for the pilot 
to respond. Beginning a t  t=12.3 sec we have 
shown (dotted) in figure 1, a compensating left 
turn by aircraft A which is similar but opposite 
to the turn which initiated the blunder. This, it 
may be observed, carries aircraft A well clear of 
the no transgression line. 
But suppose that the pilot of aircraft A does 
not receive the warning, or for some reason fails 
to heed it. Because of the small displacement 
between the uncorrected and corrected tracks, 
this may or may not be evident to the air traffic 
controller a t  t =  15 see. We will presume, how- 
ever, that he at least suspects the danger, and 
that he practically instantaneously decides to 
command a collision avoidance manuever for 
aircraft 3. 
What is a reasonable estimate for the controller 
decision and communication time as well as for 
the reaction time of the pilot of aircraft B? 
Data on which to base such an estimate are 
not abundantly available. 
A lower bound for the estimate, however, 
might be discovered by reconsidering the two- 
operator tracking tests conducted by Russell 
(ref. 5). I n  these experiments a “director” ob- 
served a compensatory display of tracking error 
and gave verbal instructions to a “tracker” who 
then operated a handwheel control so as to null 
the error perceived by the director. The con- 
trolled element was a pure gain. The course or 
forcing function was a sum of four sine waves. 
Figure 2 is a replot of a sample of Russell’s two 
operator data and the corresponding single oper- 
ator data for the same tracker. The effective time 
delay, T ~ ,  for the single tracker is estimated, from 
a fit to the phase lag data, to be 0.2 sec. The two 
operators together seem to be characterized by a 
lag-lead describing function which includes a 
larger delay. If the phase angle contribution of 
the lag-lead characteristic is subtracted from the 
totaI phase Iag of the two-operator describing 
function, the residual phase lag corresponds to a 
time delay of 0.8 sec. This leads us to conclude 
that (exclusive of the tracker’s delay) the average 
time delay ascribable to the director’s decision 
and communication delays is: 
AT., = 0.6 sec. 
This estimate is rather neatly supported by the 
observation that, on the average, instructions 
from the director to the tracker were communi- 
cated 48 times per minute, or equivalently with 
an intersample interval of 1.25 sec. The effective 
average time delay is almost exactly half the 
sample interval. The nature of the instructions 
from the director in this case, however, was 
extremely simple, comprising a series of com- 
mands such as “left, left, right, right, right, left 
. . .” to each of which the tracker responded 
with standardized increments of control deflec- 
tion. Furthermore, it may be that this continu- 
ous tracking experiment is not representative of 
what might be expected in the case of discrete 
events. Nevertheless, considering the necessity 
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FIQURE 2.-Comparison of Russell's (ref. 5) measured 
open-loop describing functions for one- and two- 
operator tracking. 
for more complicated messages and the fact that 
the message is not necessarily expected by, in the 
second case, the pilot, we might guess that in the 
case of air traffic control, the controller's decision 
and communications delay might be as little as 
two to three times the average decision and 
communications delay from the two-operator 
tracking tests. 
One source of data on actual two-way trans- 
missions between air traffic controllers and pilots 
is reference 6 which discusses several examples of 
two-way transmissions of nonurgent messages in 
which the time difference between the initiation 
of the message and the reply or acknowledgment 
is as little as 4 to 5 sec. 
From this we conclude that the controller's 
decision and communication time, as it enters 
into our problem, is unlikely to be much less than 
2 sec, nor more than 4. We shall take 2 see as 
representative. It would be interesting to mea- 
sure controller's decision and communication 
times in simulator experiments if this has not 
already been done. 
Assuming that the pilot of aircraft B is alert 
and that he knows that at  approach altitudes, 
for an intrusion from the side, a pull-up and 
climb is the preferred avoidance maneuver; we 
ask: What are the response times of the pilot and 
the aircraft? 
Figure 3 (taken from reference 7) shows step 
reaction times for visual stimuli. It shows that 
0 Disjunctive RT 
A S i m p  RT 
Bar Length Indicates Standard 
Deviatm About Mean 
20 23 24 25 Day 1965Feb18 19 
FIGURE 3.-Run-to-Run variability of the 
20-trial step reaction time samples. 
if the direction of the response is not known 
beforehand (disjunctive reaction time) the mean 
reciprocal reaction time is approximately 3 - I  see. 
In  the absence of better information on step 
responses to aural stimuli we take as representa- 
tive of the step response of the pilot of aircraft B 
to the warning of the controller a time delay of 
0.33 sec. 
The response of the aircraft to pilot control 
may be represented by a flight path response to 
pitch attitude commands. In  transfer functions 
form this is 
(1) 
-- ~ ( 4  . exp (-e's> 
eo(s)- Te,'s+1 
where 
 is the closed-loop system delay (a frac- 
tion of a second) 
W 
-=wing loading X 
g = acceleration of gravity 
p = air density 
Uo = trimmed airspeed 
CLa = aircraft's lift curve slope. 
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The quantity To: is often termed the flight path 
response time constant. Note how it  depends on 
the aircraft's performance, notably on the wing 
loading and approach speed. Small time con- 
stants are, of course, desirable. For the DC-8, 
TO: is approximately 1.56 sec in approach. It is 
only about 0.5 sec for the Navion. 
The minimum pull-up maneuvering time, fol- 
lowing receipt of the climb command by the 
pilot, can be computed as the sum of the effective 
closed loop time delay, 76' plus the time to estab- 
lish the flight path acceleration 3Te: plus the 
time to terminate the flight path acceleration 
re'+3Te,' plus an interval of steady acceleration 
(A, - ho)gngmaI. Here nzma, is the maximum normal 
acceleration in g units. It is limited in the case 
of interest here by the approach to a stall. I n  
the form of a sum, the minimum pull-up maneu- 
vering time T ,  then becomes 
(2 )  
he - h 0  
T ,  = %ef+6Te: + 
gnz,,, 
where 
h,=the rate of climb command 
&=the initial rate of climb or descent. 
The displacement d which can be achieved a t  
time t after command of the pull-up maneuver 
and steady climb can be calculated with good 
approximation by assuming constant velocity U o  
and using the equation 
ratio (modified by the pitch attitude 
feedback) 
wSp' =modified aircraft short period natural 
frequency (rad-') (modified by the 
pitch attitude feedback). 
For the case of a D G 8  going from an initial glide 
path sink of Sate -3.05 m/sec (- 10 ft/sec) to a 
steady rate of climb at +3.05 m/sec (600 ft/min) 
(low, but convenient), substitution in equation 
(2) yields T i  = 10.35 sec. 
A more elaborate calculation, which is capable 
of showing the effect of the steady climb after the 
T,,, sec have elapsed, yields the results shown in 
figure 4. Plotted there is the time required to 
reach a given displacement above an initially 
descending path. Note that the effect of the 
incremental load factor in the pull-up is com- 
paratively small. The biggest effects are, of 
course, to be found in the steady rate of climb 
which may be achieved. This depends primarily 
on the thrust to weight ratio. The actual formula 
is 
where 
(RIC)  =rate of climb 
T = thrust 
D = drag 
Uo = aircraft velocity 
W = aircraft weight. 
(5) 
- 
T, In a missed approach pull-up, the drag is small 
compared to the thrust, and the climbout velocity d( t )  = h c [ U ( t -  T m )  It+ "1 y ( t )  dt (3)  
is likely to be nearly the same for a variety of 
aircraft. The big differences between aircraft will where y ( t ) ,  the aircraft's flight path angle, is the inverse Laplace transform of the product of 
equation ( 1 )  multiplied by the transform of the 
pitch attitude command e,, viz., 
(4) 
Here 
u(.) =unit step function applied at time (") 
%8PF 
T ~ / = T ~ + Y  
re = pilot's reaction time delay for a deter- 
rsp' = modified aircraft short period damping 
ministic input G0.33 sec 
I 
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FIQURE 4.-Theoretical minimum time to reach a given 
displacement above the glideslope by a pull-up avoid- 
ance maneuver and steady climb. 
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then reside in their different thrust to weight 
ratios. This, of course, is one of the most impor- 
tant determinants of performance in many dif- 
ferent respects, but we are not likely to see any 
spectacular improvements here because high 
thrust to weight ratios tend to make airplanes 
uneconomic. 
Figure 4 may be used to estimate a lower bound 
on the elapsed time interval required to achieve, 
say, 140 m (460 ft) of displacement above the 
glideslope, for example; if the maximum incre- 
mental acceleration is limited to one-half g and 
the final steady rate of climb is 1800 ft/min. By 
entering on the abscissa of figure 4 at 140 m 
(460 f t ) ,  the time ordinate corresponds to the 
solid line for 9.15 m/sec (1800 ft/min) (denoted 
by the square symbol). It may be read as 15 sec 
elapsed time. To this time interval following 
receipt of the climb command by the pilot must 
be added the ATC surveillance, identification, 
intervention, and communication delay. Thus, a 
typical overall latent period between the initia- 
tion of a lateral threat to an aircraft of the 
approach and achievement of 140 m (460 f t )  
separation above the intruder is on the order of 
one-half minute or about one-quarter of the time 
required to fly from the outer marker to the 
middle marker. 
The results are similar if we consider intrusions 
from above in which the most correct response is 
a lateral avoidance maneuver. Such a maneuver 
is the familiar side-step whereby lateral displace- 
ment is achieved by a double sinusoidal aileron 
command which recovers the original direction 
of flight. After achieving a safe lateral standoff, 
the pilot of the evading aircraft can then execute 
a missed approach. 
Figure 5 (fig. 28 of ref. 8) shows the time re- 
quired to achieve a given lateral separation by 
a double banking maneuver (X-turn). (Ref. 9 has 
shown that the approximate theory is confirmed 
by experiments with 14 aircraft flown by airline 
and professional test pilots.) 
I n  Figure 5, the maximum bank angle, qmax, 
and the maximum roll rate, p, might possibly 
be somewhat altered and the results recomputed. 
The values assumed are typical, however. 
We may use figure 5 to estimate a lower bound 
on the elapsed time interval required to achieve, 
say, 152 m (500 .ft) of lateral separation if the 
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FIQURE 5.-Theoretical minimum times for sinusoidal 
maneuvers limited by rate of roll (fig. 28 of ref. 8). 
maximum roll rate (pmax) is limited to 10 deg/sec. 
By entering the abscissa of figure 5 at  152 m 
(500 ft), the time ordinate corresponding to the 
boundary for p,,= 10 deg/sec (denoted by the 
circular symbol) can be interpolated between 16 
and 17 sec elapsed time for the maneuver. This 
value is seen to be similar to the one for the 
pull-up maneuver. 
If the evasive maneuver were considered to be 
a turn away from the course and then flight in 
a straight line, the same separation distances 
would be achieved in somewhat shorter times. 
The improvement would not, however, be as- 
tounding. It appears that the pilot aircraft com- 
bination will typically require about 15 sec to 
achieve 152 m (500 ft) of lateral separation with 
aircraft as we have known them to be configured. 
Can anything else be done? Very large thrust to 
weight ratios, the availability of large amounts 
of direct lift control, and anything that would 
induce the pilots to use larger bank angles would 
help. No dramatic improvement in these factors, 
however, is likely to be brought about. 
We have now seen that, a t  least for the choice 
of a miss distance of 140 to 152 m (460 to 500 ft), 
either the side-step or the pull-up takes approxi- 
mately 15 sec for typical values of the parameters 
for transport aircraft. Since we have also seen 
further above, that in connection with the proto- 
type problem the effective controller’s delay (in- 
cluding data acquisition (three scans = 15 sec) 
and communication delays (2 sec)) is currently, 
perhaps, of the order of 17 sec, the total system 
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response time TR is likely to  be approximately 
32 sec. Thus, in our prototype problem, the sys- 
tem is ((safe” a t  a runway separation of 1250 m 
(4100 f t ) ,  if a miss distance of 140 m (460 ft) is 
considered acceptable. 
CONCLUSION 
For a typical case of independent approaches 
to parallel runways, there is an appreciable prob- 
ability of a blunder. The safe spacing of runways 
depends on making the system reaction time T R  
sufficiently small so that adequate miss distances 
can be achieved between aircraft on collision 
courses when the air traffic controller must 
intervene. 
The dominant effects are comprised within the 
times required to predict the impending collision 
and for the aircraft to respond to a collision 
avoidance maneuver command. Of the 32sec 
system response time calculated in connection 
with the prototype problem, only 2 sec are 
ascribable to the controller’s decision and com- 
munication delays, and only 0.33 sec to the 
pilot’s response time. No effective improvement 
is to be expected from attempts to improve the 
performance of the human operators. The re- 
sponse time of the aircraft is likewise not readily 
amenable to improvement. The installation of 
track-while-scan (phased array) radars, and com- 
puter prediction of conflicts possibly based on 
down-link transmission of airborne sensor data 
could reduce the system reaction time by per- 
haps 5 sec. This would allow the runways to be 
safely spaced at 1036 m (3400 ft) in the proto- 
type problem. The data linking of collision avoid- 
ance maneuver commands could possibly obviate 
the necessity for the 2 sec communication time 
we have allowed. This would then allow the 
runways to be separated by only 945 m (3100 ft). 
Further reduction in the spacing to the 762 m 
(2500 ft) called for in reference 1 would then be 
at the expense of miss distance in the event of a 
critical blunder. 
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